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Law and Religion in the Eastern Mediterranean. From Antiquity to Early Islam. Edited by Anselm C. Hagedorn 
and Reinhard G. Kratz. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. xviii + 408. £80 (cloth).
reViewed By Birgit cHriStianSen, Institut für Assyriologie und Hethitologie, LMU München
The volume under review comprises fourteen articles 
by scholars from different fields of ancient studies en-
compassing Hebrew Bible, ancient Greece, the ancient 
Near East, Qumran, Elephantine, the Nabataeans, and 
the early Arab world. The introduction by the editors 
of the volume outlines the topic, structure and aims 
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of the book and gives a short overview of the articles’ 
contents (pp. 1–9). Unlike other studies on ancient 
law and religion, the present volume is intended to 
“broaden the interpretative framework by looking be-
yond the individual society” instead of concentrating 
on a particular society or cultural realm (p. 1). Center-
ing on the relationship between law and religion, the 
collection aims at investigating “cultural similarities 
and differences across geographical and historical 
space” in the Eastern Mediterranean (p. 2). Due to 
the important role of the Eastern Mediterranean in 
cross-cultural exchange processes and historical de-
velopments between different oriental and occidental 
societies, the broad perspective of the collection is 
most welcome and stimulating for future research.
In this regard, however, the assortment of the cul-
tures and textual traditions covered in the book seems 
unbalanced. That is, unlike what the title of the book 
suggests, the emphasis is clearly on the Hebrew Bible, 
which is the topic of the seven articles of part II (pp. 
184–394). In contrast, the cuneiform sources are only 
included “as a constant point of reference, especially 
for the study of biblical law” (p. 2). The choice is ex-
plained by the long-term study the cuneiform sources 
have experienced in comparison to the biblical mate-
rial. This, however, applies mainly to certain texts and 
to the question of how parallels between the ancient 
Near Eastern and biblical texts are to be explained. As 
with many areas of life, the interconnection and inter-
play between legal and religious concepts have not, 
so far, been very well studied. This includes, e.g., the 
question of which actions are considered to be legal or 
religious transgressions, and the respective sentencing 
procedures. In addition, various texts and text genres 
among the ancient Near Eastern cuneiform sources 
have thus far received little attention by scholars of 
biblical studies. This applies, for instance, to texts from 
the Hittite and Old Assyrian cuneiform sources, as well 
as to the Hieroglyphic Luwian and Lycian inscriptions. 
Correspondingly, they are also virtually ignored in the 
present volume, even though inclusion there would 
have been illuminating in a number of instances (for 
which see below). In view of this, one might also ask 
why the editors decided to include a revised and up-
dated English version of a German-language article by 
Josef Wiesehöfer that was already published in Recht 
und Religion: Menschliche und göttliche Gerechtigkeits-
vorstellungen in den antiken Welten, ed. H. Barta, R. 
Rollinger, and M. Lang (Wiesbaden, 2008), 191–204.
Despite this imbalance, the volume comprises very 
interesting and stimulating articles addressing a wide 
range of cultures, textual traditions, and topics. Al-
though each contribution focuses on different sub-
jects and textual sources, there are many links between 
them. This applies particularly to the function of 
oaths, curses, ordeals, and oracles in legal procedures 
and the underlying interplay between the human and 
divine sphere (see A. David for Egypt, M. Gagarin for 
Early Greece, F. S. Naiden for the Near Eastern and 
Greek law codes, J. F. Healey for the Nabataeans, and 
B. S. Jackson for the Hebrew Bible); the role of the 
divine sphere in the lawgiving process and in jurisdic-
tion (see Gagarin for Greece, Healey for the Naba-
taeans, Naiden for the Near Eastern and Greek law 
collections, E. Otto for Deuteronomy, A. Shemesh for 
Qumran, and I. Schneider for Early Islam); and devel-
opments in the legal history of ancient Israel under the 
influence of neighboring cultures and their reflection 
in the literary history of Deuteronomy (Otto, R. G. 
Kratz, and B. Wells).
A number of articles deal with specific legal terms 
(J. Wiesehöfer for Ancient Iran) and/or specific laws 
or legal procedures like sale (A. D. Gross for Aramaic 
law) and marriage and divorce (A. F. Botta, Jackson, 
and Wells for the Hebrew Bible, the Aramaic docu-
ments from Elephantine and ancient Near Eastern 
cuneiform sources). Several articles are centered on 
specific texts like Deuteronomy (Otto, Kratz, Wells), 
Job (F. R. Magdalene), the Early Islamic book al-
Aḥkām al-sulṭāniyya (Schneider) or particular text 
genres like tomb inscriptions (Healey for Nabatean 
culture) and sale documents (Gross for Aramaic 
Law). In view of the many interrelations between 
the articles and sometimes controversial views (cf., 
e.g., the different interpretations of the Aramaic and 
Hebrew verb ׂשנא by Botta and Wells) the use of 
cross-references as well as a word index would have 
been advantageous.
In the following a few remarks will be made on 
single articles:
The article of David (pp. 13–39) emphasizes the 
common features between legal and religious language 
and rituals in the Ramesside period of ancient Egypt. 
Since a similar interrelationship is also to be found in 
sources of neighboring cultures, occasional references 
(e.g., to the legal language and concepts in ancient 
Near Eastern invocation rituals) would have enriched 
the otherwise very illuminating study. It should fur-
ther be noted that the curse formula of Ramesses II’s 
Hittite treaty, cited by the author as an example of 
the interplay between the legal and religious realm 
in Egyptian culture (p. 19), originates in the Hittite 
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treaty tradition (see B. Christiansen, Schicksalsbestim-
mende Kommunikation. Sprachliche, gesellschaftliche 
und religiöse Aspekte hethitischer Fluch-, Segens- und 
Eidesformeln, Studien zu den Boğazköy-Texten 53 
[Wiesbaden, 2012]).
A further shortcoming is the lack of differentia-
tion between various types of curses, such as uncon-
ditional and conditional curses, or curses phrased as 
a plea to a deity (e.g., “may god X destroy you”) and 
curses like “you will perish” or “he belongs to the 
flame.” Although all types can be addressed as per-
formative speech, the assertions that “saying a curse 
accomplishes it” and “cursing is already punishing” 
(p. 21) are only applicable to some types of curses (see, 
e.g., A.-M. Kitz, Cursed are You! The Phenomenol-
ogy of Cursing in Cuneiform and Hebrew Texts [Wi-
nona Lake, 2014] p. 66 and chapter 7; Christiansen, 
Schicksalsbestimmende Kommunikation, pp. 419f., 
519f. passim).
In his discussion of the legal use of the Aramaic 
verb ׂשנא lit. “to hate” (pp. 105–28), Botta rejects 
the definition of the verb given by H. Z. Szubin and 
B. Porten in their article “The Status of a Repudiated 
Spouse: A New Interpretation of Kraeling 7 (TAD 
B3.8),” Israel Law Review 35 (2001): 46–78 (on p. 
120 erroneously cited by Botta as Porter and Szubin 
1995). According to Szubin and Porten, in the Ele-
phantine papyri the term denotes the demotion of 
the status of a spouse within an ongoing matrimonial 
bond. On the basis of a comparison of attestations of 
the Hebrew verb ׂשנא in the Hebrew Bible as well as 
the Egyptian and Akkadian equivalents msḏj and zēru, 
Botta affirms the traditional interpretation of ׂשנא as 
an Aramaic legal term for divorce. While Botta’s argu-
mentation against Porter’s and Szubin’s interpretation 
of the Elephantine references is overall convincing, he 
seems not to differentiate clearly enough between the 
petition for divorce by one of the marriage partners 
and its approval by a court or another legal authority. 
According to the Elephantine legal documents cited 
by Botta, the verb appears to denote the petition for 
divorce, but not the legal dissolution of the marriage. 
The latter required a legal process that obligated the 
marriage partner who asked for the divorce to forgo 
rights to certain money and property (see also Wells, 
p. 302, note 49). Contra Botta (p. 119), this obliga-
tion is hardly meant as a penalty, but as a financial 
compensation. Another shortcoming is that the au-
thor tends to ignore attestations that are not compat-
ible with the interpretation as a term denoting the end 
of a relationship, especially in the Hebrew Bible (for 
which see also the examination by Wells: “The Hated 
Wife in Deuteronomic Law,” Vetus Testamentum 60 
[2010]: 131–46). Furthermore, the analysis of the 
side-by-side occurrence of the verbs zēru “to hate” 
and abātu “to flee” or, in another copy, ḫabātu “to 
move across, roam through” in LE §30 in terms of a 
“hendiadyc pair” (p. 115) does not seem appropriate 
in the context of the respective legal clause.
Very interesting in view of cross-cultural com-
parison is the article by Healey on fines and curses 
among the Nabataeans (pp. 165–86). Focusing on 
the characteristics of the Nabatean tomb inscriptions, 
Healey notes that their closest parallels are the Greek 
and Lycian tomb inscriptions from the epichoric and 
early Hellenistic period in Lycia (with most epichoric 
Lycian inscriptions, contra Healey p. 167, dating to 
the fourth instead of the fifth century Bce). The simi-
larities among these inscriptions are indeed striking. 
It is regrettable, therefore, that Healey does not pro-
vide a detailed comparison. This applies particularly 
to the character of the inscriptions as summaries of 
legal contracts kept in temples or archives, the legal 
dispositions regarding the plots of the tombs and the 
combination of fines and curses as sanctions for tomb 
violations (which are, in contrast to Healey’s claim 
on p. 173, also a typical feature of the Lycian tomb 
inscriptions; for a short overview see B. Christiansen, 
“Typen von Sanktionsformeln in den lykischen Grab-
inschriften und ihre Funktionen,” in *h2nr. Festschrift 
für Heiner Eichner, ed. Robert Nedoma and David 
Stifter, Die Sprache 48 [2009]: 44–54).
Naiden’s article, “Gods, Kings, and Lawgivers” (pp. 
79–104), offers a comparison between the roles of 
deities and rulers in the lawgiving process in Meso-
potamia, ancient Israel and Greece. Since cross-cul-
tural research has so far focused on the relationship 
between the ancient Near Eastern and biblical texts, 
the inclusion of the Greek sources is very welcome. 
A deficiency of the study is, however, the omission 
of the Hittite, Neo-Babylonian and Middle Assyrian 
law collections, which show quite a different picture 
in comparison to the sources examined by Naiden. 
A further shortcoming is the lack of differentiation 
between the image of the ruler’s role depicted in the 
law collections and the controversially debated actual 
impact of the ruler on the formation of laws (for an 
overview, see S. A. Jackson, A Comparison of Ancient 
Near Eastern Law Collections Prior to the First Millen-
nium bc [New Jersey, 2008], 69–113 and 257–76).
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In his discussion of the relationship between law 
and religion in the Bible (pp. 189–209) B. S. Jackson 
addresses, inter alia, the Deuteronomic application of 
talion. For Deut. 19:21, “Your eye shall not pity; it 
shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand 
for hand, foot for foot,” he suggests that an impor-
tant aspect of the talionic punishments is the manifest 
visibility on the offender’s body. Thus, the observers 
“will continually be reminded of the offence, both on 
its iniquity and of the consequences of performing it” 
(pp. 204f.). As also indicated by Deut. 19:20, this in-
deed appears to be a crucial function of many forms of 
talion and the related mirror punishments. It should, 
however, be noted that in case of the death penalty 
the offense is, in contrast to the other punishments 
listed in Deut. 19:21, only visible for a short period 
of time (see, e.g., the regulation in Deut. 21:22f.). 
Accordingly, Deut. 19:20 does not explain the pun-
ishment as a means to continually remind the people 
of the offense by its permanent representation on the 
offender’s body, but only states that the punishment 
should make the people take notice of the deed and 
become afraid in order to prevent them from similar 
offenses in the future.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
